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CIVIL RIGHTS-42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983: STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS-EIGHTH CIRCUIT REJECTS TORT ANALOGY. Garmon v.
Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982).
A package addressed to Mark Garmon, the plaintiff, was deliv-
ered to his residence hall at Drake University. The package was
given to the defendant policeman, Foust, who opened it without a
search warrant or probable cause. After he discovered a controlled
substance inside the package, he resealed it and delivered it to Gar-
mon's room. A search warrant was issued the following day, Gar-
mon's dormitory room was searched, and incriminating evidence
was seized by the defendant police officers. Garmon was charged
with possession of a controlled substance, but the charge was subse-
quently dropped because the evidence was suppressed.
More than two years later, Garmon filed a civil rights action
against the police officers under section 1983,1 alleging that the de-
fendants had deprived him of his fourth amendment 2 right to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and had violated
his fourteenth amendment 3 right not to be deprived of property
without due process of law. The defendant policemen asserted
Iowa's two-year statute of limitations governing suits for injuries to
the person or reputation as a defense.4
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other persons within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part: "nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
4. IOWA CODE AN. § 614.1 2 (West Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
.Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after
their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:
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The United States District Court5 held that the action was
timely under Iowa's general five-year statute of limitations for all
actions not specifically governed by other statutes. 6 The Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling and stated
that the warrantless seizure of Garmon's property and the subse-
quent search of his dormitory room did more than cause damage to
his person or reputation; they violated his "constitutional right not to
be so treated by persons acting under color of state law.' 7 Garmon v.
Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982).
Congress originally enacted section 1983 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 18718 to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment.9 Section 1983 created a federal cause of action for dep-
rivation of constitutional and civil rights under color of state law
and imposed liability on those who deprived a citizen or other per-
son of those rights.'" The United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that section 1983 is a broad statutory remedy" that is supple-
Those founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative
rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty, within two years.
5. District court decisions for the southern district of Iowa have been inconsistent in
applying Iowa's statutes of limitations to section 1983 actions. Eg., Rosales v. Lewis, 454 F.
Supp. 956 (S.D. Iowa 1978), and Silliman v. Rice, No. 79-29-2 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 10, 1980)
(order denying motion to dismiss), applied Iowa's two-year statute of limitations and appar-
ently adopted the tort analogy. In contrast, Barrett v. Wichael, 387 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. Iowa
1974), and Garmon v. Foust, No. 77-367-2 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 17, 1980) (order denying sum-
mary judgment), applied Iowa's five-year statute of limitations for actions not specifically
governed by other statutes and apparently rejected the tort analogy.
6. IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.1 4 (West Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively, after
their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:
Those founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property,
or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court
of chancery, and all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect, within
five years, except as provided by subsection 8.
7. Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).
8. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
9. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was popu-
larly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, and its title stated its purpose as "[a]n Act to
[EInforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes." Lawless conditions existed in the South following the Civil
War, which rendered life and property insecure, and the Act was passed to provide a remedy
for deprivation of constitutional and civil rights. Id at 171-80.
10. See supra note 1 for the present text of § 1983.
11. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.§. 167 (1961). The Court stated that section 1983 had three
main aims: (1) "it might . . . override certain kinds of state laws," that is, legislation by
states against the rights of citizens of the United States; (2) "it provided a remedy where state
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mentary to any remedy a state might provide. 12
Congress did not include a specific limitations period for ac-
tions brought under section 1983. However, other federal legislation
provides a possible independent statutory basis for determining the
applicable time period. Section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act13 pro-
vides that federal law will be supplemented by state law when the
federal provisions are insufficient to achieve the objectives of the
civil rights statutes.' 4 The Rules of Decision Act' 5 requires use of
state law in appropriate cases. Both of these federal statutes indicate
that state law governs federal causes of action that have no limita-
tions period, but emphasize that state law may not apply when it is
inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States.' 6
The silence of Congress on the issue of statutes of limitations
caused the federal courts to apply state statutes of limitations in fed-
eral civil rights cases. Congress acquiesced in this tradition for al-
law was inadequate;" and, (3) it provided "a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not avai'able in practice." 365 U.S. at 173-74.
12. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183. The Court stated, "It is no answer that the State
has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked." Id
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into
effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in
the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause ....
14. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484 (1980) ("In... § 1988, Congress
'quite clearly instructs [federal courts] to refer to state statutes' when federal law provides no
rule of decision for actions brought under § 1983.") (quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584 (1978)).
15. Rules of Decision Act, Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (1976)). 28 U.S.C. § 1652 provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply."
16. Quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) the Court in Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980) stated, "[Section] 1988 authorizes federal courts to
disregard an otherwise applicable state rule of law only if the state law is 'inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States'."
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most seventy years.' 7  It seems certain that if Congress had
disagreed with the practice, it would have "spoken to overturn it by
enacting a uniform period of limitations."' 8
Federal courts have not mechanically applied state statutes of
limitations simply because the federal statute lacks a limitations pe-
riod. Federal courts need not apply state statutes of limitations if
they frustrate or interfere with implementation of national poli-
cies. 19 State law has been considered the primary, but not the exclu-
sive, guide.20 The Supreme Court rejected application of state
limitations to employment discrimination suits brought by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2' under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as inconsistent with the underlying policies of the
federal statute.22 Generally, the federal courts have been reluctant
to hold state statutes of limitations inconsistent with federal legisla-
tion, although the courts have discussed the matter frequently.23
Occasionally a dissenting judge has expressed the belief that there is
a need for uniformity in the particular area or that state law is in-
17. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (Civil Rights Act of 1871);
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318 (1914) (Civil Rights Act of 1871).
18. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966). Even though Hoosier
was an action brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, rather than a civil rights
action, the same reasoning applies.
19. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696,
706-07 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895).
20. E.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977); Johnson v. Rail-
way Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).
21. The EEOC may bring an enforcement action against a private employer for viola-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the action is not subject to state statutes of limita-
tions. E.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366-72 (1977).
22. Id The Court explained that the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) created a procedural struc-
ture for bringing employment discrimination suits by the EEOC. The Commission is
charged with investigating these claims and settling them by informal methods if concilia-
tion is possible. The Commission must refrain from suing until it has discharged its admin-
istrative responsibilities. Application of a state's limitation period would not further the
policy of conciliation. 432 U.S. at 366-72. The Court held that California's one-year statute
of limitations could, under some circumstances, conflict with that policy. Id at 368-69. The
Court further stated, "But even in cases involving no inevitable and direct conflict with the
express time periods provided in the Act, absorption of state limitations would be inconsis-
tent with the congressional intent underlying the enactment of the 1972 amendments." Id
at 369 (Rehnquist, J. & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. See cases cited supra note 19.
1982] STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 421
consistent with federal policy.24 However, in civil rights actions, the
Court has stated, "The need for uniformity, while paramount under
some federal statutory schemes, has not been held to warrant dis-
placement of state statutes of limitations for civil rights actions. '25
Thus, when Congress has created a cause of action and has not
specified the period of time within which it may be asserted, federal
courts generally have applied the state statute of limitations for an
analogous type of action.26 The Supreme Court has expressly ap-
proved this practice of "borrowing" the applicable state statute of
limitations and has applied it in many contexts.27
The Court first applied the rule that relevant state statutes of
limitations were applicable in civil rights actions in O'Sullivan v. Fe-
lix. 28 In O'Sullivan the plaintiff was assaulted when he attempted to
vote, and the Court applied Louisiana's one-year statute of limita-
tions for damages resulting from personal assault.29 Over sixty
years later, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,3 ° an employment
discrimination suit, the Court still applied the most appropriate stat-
ute of limitations provided by state law and held that Tennessee's
one-year statute of limitations for civil actions brought under the
federal civil rights statutes specifically applied.3 1 In a recent action
brought under section 1983, Board of Regents v. Tomanio,32 the
24. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 494-99 (1980) (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 470-73 (1975)
(Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 709-14 (1966) (White, Douglas, and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
25. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489 (1980).
26. E.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980); Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1971); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-05 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331
U.S. 461, 463 (1947); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 322 (1914); Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 618 (1895).
27. E.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105 (1971) (The Court applied Louisi-
ana's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury in a cause of action which arose
under the federal Outer Continental Shelf Act.); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 707 (1966) (The Court applied Indiana's six-year statute of limitations for suits gov-
erning contracts not in writing in a case involving the federal Labor Management Relations
Act.); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 468 (1947) (The Court applied Kentucky's five-year
statute of limitations for liability created by statute when the case arose under the National
Bank Act.); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 621 (1895) (The federal legislation in-
volved was the Patent Act and the Court applied Massachusetts' six-year statute of limita-
tions for tort actions).
28. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
29. Id at 325.
30. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
31. Id at 462.
32. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
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Court applied New York's three-year statute of limitations. The
Court noted that when Congress does not establish a statute of limi-
tations applicable to actions brought under a federal statute, the
Supreme Court "has repeatedly 'borrowed' the state law of limita-
tions governing an analogous cause of action. ' 33 Here, also, the
Court pointed out that state law is only a guide and may be dis-
placed when its application would be inconsistent with the federal
policy underlying the cause of action.34
The federal practice of "borrowing" state statutes of limitations
in civil rights suits and applying the most analogous one has re-
sulted in confusion among the lower federal courts because the
courts have drawn differing analogies between section 1983 actions
and state forms of action. Since many section 1983 cases involve
wrongs that resemble common-law torts, for example, false impris-
onment, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery, several cir-
cuits have applied various state tort statutes. 35  These circuits
emphasize the nature of the defendant's conduct rather than the
unique nature of the federal claim.36 The result reached depends on
the particular fact situation and the state statutory scheme. A fed-
eral court might be required to apply several statutes of limitations
to a cause of action under section 1983.37 The confusion which re-
sults in such situations is epitomized in Polite v. Diehl,38 in which the
33. Id at 483-84.
34. Id at 485; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975).
35. See, e.g., Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981) (in which the court
applied Virginia's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Rubin v.
O'Koren, 644 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1981) (in which the court applied Alabama's one-year
statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974)
(in which the court applied several state tort statutes); Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th
Cir. 1969) (in which the court applied Michigan's three-year statute of limitations for per-
sonal injury actions).
36. E.g., Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564, 567 (6th Cir. 1969).
37. E.g., Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1974).
38. 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974). The plaintiff brought suit against city policemen for
false arrest, assault and battery, illegal seizure of his car, and coercion of a guilty plea.
Pennsylvania had a one-year statute of limitations for false arrest, a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury, a six-year statute of limitations for recovery of goods, and a
two-year statute of limitations for wrongful personal injury not resulting in death. The court
said the claims were not governed by a single limitations statute, and a federal court was
required to apply the same statute of limitations as the state court would apply in state
actions seeking similar relief so that the district court should have applied a separate statute
to each cause of action. The plaintiff's action for false arrest was barred under the one-year
statute of limitations. However, his actions for assault and battery were timely since they
were filed within the two-year statute of limitations; his action for illegal seizure was timely
because it was filed within the six-year statute of limitations, and the suit for coercion of a
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court applied four different tort statutes of limitations and held the
action barred under one statute and timely under the other three.
Other actions under section 1983 have no tort similarity, for
example, segregation and deprivation of voting rights. Conse-
quently, several circuits have applied statutes of limitations for lia-
bility created by statute.39 These circuits view the federal cause of
action as much broader and as much more serious than the torts
described in the state statutes.40 They emphasize the nature of the
complaint rather than the defendant's conduct; they characterize
section 1983 claims as actions created by statute.4' The Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized the distinction between actions brought under sec-
tion 1983 and state tort actions in Smith v. Cremins4 2 and then
applied California's three-year statute of limitations for actions
based upon a liability created by statute.43 The Ninth Circuit stated
the distinction:
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act clearly creates rights
and imposes obligations different from any which would exist at
common law in the absence of statute. A given state of facts may
of course give rise to a cause of action in common-law tort as well
as to a cause of action under Section 1983, but the elements of the
two are not the same. The elements of an action under Section
1983 are (1) the denial under color of state law (2) of a right se-
cured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Neither
of these elements would be required to make out a cause of ac-
tion in common-law tort; both might be present without creating
common-law tort liability.'
A few circuits have followed the state statute of limitations
which specifically governs federal civil rights actions.4 5 Only a few
guilty plea was timely because it was filed within the two-year statute of limitations for
wrongful personal injury not resulting in death.
39. See, e.g., Major v. Arizona State Prison, 642 F.2d 311 (9th Cir. 1981) (in which the
court applied Arizona's one-year statute of limitations); Taylor v. Mayone, 626 F.2d 247 (2d
Cir. 1980) (in which the court applied New York's three-year statute of limitations); White v.
Padgett, 475 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 861 (1973) (in which the court
applied Florida's three-year statute of limitations).
40. These circuits adopt the reasoning of Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). He stated, "[A] deprivation of a constitutional right is
significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and
the deprivation of a constitutional right." Id at 196.
41. E.g., Major v. Arizona State Prison, 642 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
43. Id at 190.
44. id
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 489 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973), af#'d,
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states have enacted such statutes.46 The case law interpreting these
state-enacted federal civil rights statutes of limitations indicates that
the statutes will be followed in section 1983 cases4 7 unless they are
found to be inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 8
Since most states lack a limitations period for federal civil
rights actions and several states have no statutorily created liability,
other circuits are left with a choice between tort statutes and the
general catch-all statute of limitations. Faced with this choice, a few
421 U.S. 454 (1975) (in which the court applied Tennessee's one-year statute of limitations);
Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976) (in which the court
applied Nebraska's three-year statute of limitations).
46. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-106 (1973) (two years); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
219 (1979) (three years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one year). These statutes are
of two types. Tennessee's statute expressly states that it covers civil actions brought under
the federal civil rights statutes. Nebraska's and Colorado's statutes cover actions upon lia-
bility created by a federal statute. Nebraska's statute is typical and provides: "All actions
upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which
actions no period of limitations is provided in such statute shall be commenced within three
years next after the cause of action shall have accrued."
47. The Nebraska statute was held applicable in an action under §§ 1981 and 1983 in
Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976). The plaintiff alleged
his dismissal was due to his race and his exercise of first amendment speech rights. The
court held the action barred by Nebraska's three-year statute of limitations for liability cre-
ated by federal statute. Id at 231. But c. Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975). The plaintiffs in Warren brought suit under
§§ 1981 and 1982 alleging that the defendants had racially discriminated against them in the
leasing of a home. Since Nebraska had enacted a housing discrimination law, the court
applied that period of limitations and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Warren can be
distinguished from Chambers in that it was a state civil rights claim, and Nebraska had a
specific statute of limitations which applied. In Chambers, which was afederal civil rights
action, the applicable Nebraska statute of limitations was for actions based upon liability
created by federal statute.
The Colorado statute, which is similar to Nebraska's, was applied in a § 1983 and
§ 1985 action in Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966). The decedent was
allegedly arrested without a warrant, beaten, and incarcerated. The administrator of his
estate brought an action for damages for deprivation of his federal civil rights.
The Tennessee statute was applied to an action based on racial employment discrimina-
tion filed under §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 489 F.2d 525 (6th Cir. 1973), afd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
The statute also provides the applicable limitations period for a constitutional claim based
on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wright v. Tennessee, 628 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1980).
48. In 1945, Iowa had a statute which required actions arising under a federal statute to
be instituted within six months after the claim accrued, but the Eighth Circuit, with one
judge dissenting, concluded that this statute was unconstitutional as a violation of equal
protection. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), affidper
curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946). Iowa presently does not have a statute of limitations for ac-
tions arising under federal statutes.
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circuits have chosen the latter.49 These circuits reject the tort anal-
ogy and apply the statute which covers all actions for which no
other period of limitations is prescribed.5 °
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken inconsistent ap-
proaches to the application of state statutes of limitations in section
1983 cases. Various panels of the court have rejected the tort anal-
ogy,5' while other panels of the court have adopted the tort analogy
and emphasized the underlying conduct of the defendant in deter-
mining the applicable statute of limitations. 2 These two divergent
approaches are found in Glasscoe v. Howell 3 and Savage v. United
States .54
In Glasscoe an Arkansas resident brought an action against
state police officers alleging he had been arrested with unnecessary
force and violence. The court emphasized the nature, of the federal
claim being asserted by the plaintiff rather than the underlying tor-
tious conduct of the defendant.55 The court concluded that either
Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations for actions founded on
any contract or liability, express or implied 56-which had been con-
49. See, e.g., Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971) (in which the court applied
Illinois' five-year statute of limitations); Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665 (5th Cir.
1971) (in which the court applied Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations).
50. E.g., Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313, 315 (7th Cir. 1971); Franklin v. City of
Marks, 439 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. See, e.g., Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1979)
(in which the court applied Missouri's five-year statute of limitations for an action based on
liability created by statute); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (in which the court
applied Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations for actions founded on any contract or
liability, express or implied); Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1977) (decided
the same day as Clark in which the court applied the three-year Arkansas statute of limita-
tions for liability created by statute); Reed v. Hutto, 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973) (in which
the court applied Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations for liability created by statute);
Glasscoe v. Howell, 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970) (applied either Arkansas' three-year statute
of limitations for liability created by statute or the five-year general statute of limitations).
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dailey, 479 F.2d 86 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1009
(1973) (in which the court applied Iowa's two-year statute of limitations for injuries to the
person or reputation); Savage v. United States, 450 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1043 (1972) (in which the court applied Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations
pertaining to defamation and malicious prosecution).
53. 431 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1970).
54. 450 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972).
55. 431 F.2d at 865.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962) provides in part:
The following actions shall be commenced within three [3] years after the passage
of this act, or, when the cause of action shall not have accrued at the taking effect
of this act, within three [3] years after the cause of action shall accrue: . . . fourth,
all actions. . . founded on any contract or liability, express or implied;. ...
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strued by Arkansas courts to cover statutorily created liability57-- or
Arkansas' five-year general statute of limitations58 was applicable.
The court found it unnecessary to decide which statute of limita-
tions was applicable since the action was timely under either.59
In Savage the plaintiff brought an action against state officials
for malicious prosecution and deprivation of civil rights. The plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants put erroneous and defamatory mate-
rial before the grand jury, which returned an indictment. 60 The
court focused on the defendants' tortious conduct, held that Minne-
sota's two-year statute of limitations for defamation and malicious
prosecution applied, and found that the action was barred.6'
The Eighth Circuit has been more consistent in applying Ar-
kansas statutes of limitations in section 1983 actions than in apply-
ing the statutes of limitations of other states. Although in Glasscoe
the Eighth Circuit held that ether the three-year statute founded on
any contract or liability62 or the five-year catch-all statute of limita-
tions63 was applicable to an action brought under section 1983, in
Reed v. Hutto64 the court specifically rejected the general five-year
statute of limitations. 65  In Reed a prisoner brought an action
against prison officials alleging that they had failed to protect him
from being forced to participate in homosexual acts with an inmate
guard. The court applied the three-year statute of limitations but
did not state whether it applied the statute as a tort limitation or as a
57. Eg., McDonald v. Mueller, 123 Ark. 226, 183 S.W. 751 (1916); Zimmerman v.
Western & S. Fire Ins. Co., 121 Ark. 408, 181 S.W. 283 (1915); Nebraska Nat'l Bank v.
Walsh, 68 Ark. 433, 59 S.W. 952 (1900). For over eighty years, the Arkansas Supreme Court
has construed the language of the three-year limitation, "all actions founded on any contract
or liability, expressed or implied," as including liability created by statute. Although the
older cases dealt with the personal liability of corporate officers or directors to perform stat-
utory duties, those cases and § 1983 cases are similarly based upon a liability created by
statute. In the corporate cases, the liability was created by Arkansas' corporation laws,
whereas in § 1983 cases, a federal statute imposes liability upon those who deprive others of
constitutional rights. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Reed v. Hutto, 486
F.2d 534, 536 (8th Cir. 1973), it makes no difference whether the liability is created by state
statute or federal legislation; it is still a statutorily created liability.
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-213 (1962) provides: "All actions not included in the forego-
ing provisions shall be commenced within five [5] years after the cause of action shall have
accrued."
59. 431 F.2d at 865.
60. 450 F.2d at 451.
61. Id at 451-52.
62. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-206 (1962). See supra note 56 for the text of this statute.
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-213 (1962). See supra note 58 for the text of this statute.
64. 486 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1973).
65. Id. at 537.
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limitation of statutorily created liability.66
Four years later, in Clark v. Mann 67 and Williams v. Ander-
son,68 decided the same day, the court seemed to resolve the ques-
tion. The plaintiffs in both cases were black faculty members who
alleged racial discrimination in the personnel policies of their re-
spective school districts. The court reaffirmed its rejection of the
general five-year statute of limitations in section 1983 cases and
stated in Clark, "Since a § 1983 action is one to enforce a liability
created by statute, we do find an analogy between the instant case
and actions governed by [the three-year limitation]. '69  However,
later in its opinion, the court stated it would not resolve the conflict
in approaches because the same three-year limitations period
applied.7 °
Even though the language in Reed and in Clark seems confus-
ing, the result was the same-the three-year statute of limitations
applied whether viewed as a tort limitation or as a limitation on
statutorily created liability.7 '
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Garmon v. Foust 72 be-
gan its analysis by noting Supreme Court decisions which consist-
ently applied the general rule that when a federal statute creates a
federal right and provides no period of limitations, the federal
courts look to state law for guidance and "borrow" the most appro-
priate state statute of limitations.13 The court first reviewed the his-
tory of limitations of actions for civil rights suits brought under
section 198314 and looked to other federal legislation, including the
Rules of Decision Act and section 1988 of the Civil Rights Act, for
guidance in determining which statute of limitations to apply.75
66. Id The court stated that whether it focused on the underlying negligence of the
prison officials or based its decision on the rationale that the action was to enforce a statu-
tory right, the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Id at 536. In a
later case, Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 568 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1977), the court character-
ized Reed as applying a statutory liability limitation. Id at 63.
67. 562 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1977).
68. 562 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1977).
69. 562 F.2d at 1112. This statement is confusing because the three-year limitation is
applied both as a tort limitation and as a limitation on statutorily created liability. The court
appears to have intended by the language quoted that a § 1983 action should not be analo-
gized as a tort action.
70. 562 F.2d at 1112.
71. It is important to note that Arkansas has no specific provision for federal civil rights
actions, so that issue has not been important.
72. 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982).
73. Id at 403.




The court reviewed the practice followed by the other circuits.76
These circuits applied state statutes of limitations for common-law
torts, liability created by statute, or actions not specifically governed
by other statutes. Third, the court reviewed the practice that had
been followed by various panels of the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals." Often the court had followed Glasscoe,78 rejected the tort
analogy, and had applied other statutes of limitations which were
not based on the conduct of the defendant. Less often the court had
followed Savage,79 accepted the tort analogy, and had applied the
tort statute of limitations which was based on the tortious conduct of
the defendant. The result had been confusion within Eighth Circuit
decisions.
Finally, the court rejected the tort analogy, recognized the dis-
tinction between common-law tort actions and federally created
causes of action, and concluded that section 1983 does not depend
on state common law for its existence, but rather creates a new cause
of action for deprivation of civil rights."0 The court also noted that
"[a] litigant may pursue a section 1983 action rather than, or in ad-
dition to, state remedies."'8 The court expressly adopted the reason-
ing of Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Monroe v. Pape:82
"[A] deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different
from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute
both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right."8 3
Garmon is significant because it resolved inconsistent applica-
tions of Iowa statutes of limitations in section 1983 actions,8 4 and it
clarified the law in the Eighth Circuit. Garmon expressly rejected
the tort analogy that had been applied in the Eighth Circuit in Sav-
age and the cases following it and adopted the reasoning of Glass-
coe as the rule for the Eighth Circuit. Garmon also reaffirmed
application of Arkansas' three-year statute of limitations in section
1983 cases.
The court in Garmon based its conclusion on the statutory
76. Id at 403.
77. Id at 403-05.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
80. 668 F.2d at 406.
81. Id
82. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
83. 668 F.2d at 406 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 & n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
84. See supra note 5.
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scheme of each state in the Eighth Circuit and held that in Iowa, the
state's general five-year statute of limitations applies rather than a
statute based on common-law tort. Since Iowa has no period of
limitations for liability created by statute, the court was confined to
choosing between tort statutes and the general catch-all statute of
limitations. The court noted that some states in the Eighth Circuit
have a statute of limitations based on liability created by statute and
stated that that statute may govern section 1983 actions.8 6 The court
apparently intended that "liability created by statute" include liabil-
ity created by federal and state statutes. Since Nebraska has a stat-
ute of limitations which clearly applies to actions founded upon
federal statutes87 such as section 1983, and the court has applied that
statute in a federal civil rights action brought by a former guidance
counselor against a school district in Chambers v. Omaha School
District,88 it appears that the court would do the same in the future.
Should another state in the Eighth Circuit enact a statute of limita-
tions clearly applicable to federal civil rights suits, it seems apparent
that the Eighth Circuit will apply it to suits brought under section
1983 unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the
United States. 89 Since Garmon brought his civil rights action under
section 1983 only, the court stated that it limited its holding to ac-
tions brought specifically under that section. It stated that its ration-
ale might subsequently be extended to actions brought under
sections 1981 and 1985.90
In summary, if the state's statutory scheme consists of tort stat-
utes, statutorily created liability, and a general catch-all statute of
limitations, the Eighth Circuit will follow the statute of limitations
for liability created by statute. If the state's statutory scheme con-
sists of tort statutes and the general catch-all statute, the Eighth Cir-
cuit will follow the statute of limitations for actions not specifically
governed by other statutes.
Litigants in the Eighth Circuit now can be reasonably sure
about which statute of limitations the court will apply in federal
civil rights actions brought under section 1983. Iowa plaintiffs can
be guaranteed that the five-year general statute of limitations will be
85. 668 F.2d at 406.
86. Id at 406, nn. 11 & 7.
87. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-219 (1979). See supra notes 46 & 47 for the text of this statute
and case law construing it.
88. 536 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1976). See supra note 47.
89. See supra note 48.
90. 668 F.2d at 406, n.12.
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applied. Arkansas claimants can also be assured that the three-year
statute of limitations for liability created by statute will be applied
to these claims. Nebraska litigants can be reasonably certain that
the three-year statute of limitations for actions upon liability created
by federal statute will be applied. Plaintiffs from other states in the
Eighth Circuit can determine the applicable statute of limitations by
comparing the statutory scheme of their respective states with that
of Iowa, Arkansas, or Nebraska. The Eighth Circuit has finally re-
solved the issue of the applicable statute of limitations for section
1983 actions.
Martha Giopatrick
